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Abstrect
We anaZyze the impact of minimum rdage regulattons on employment and
the earnings distrtbutfon using a micro-econometric frametoork. Account is
taken of expZictt minimum aiage regulations in coLlective Labour agreements.
Thus we can tdentify the impact of mtnimum arage regulations on ruage rates
above the mínimum using cross-section vartatton of mtntmum mages across
sectors.
We estimate a static model and taw dynamic modeZs mhich ineZude Zagged
employment status as an ezpZanatory vartable. Zn the Zatter models, Zong run
and short run effects of changtng mintmum mage regulattons can be
dtsttngutshed.
Estimation and simulatton results are based on data jor Dutch males
jrom three consecutive years. Minimum mage regulattons appear to have a
substantiaZLy negative effect on employment of young males and males mith
Zom educatíon ZeveZ, mhereas the tmpact on r,iages of uwrkers mith a roage
above the mintmum appears to be significantly posttive. The efjects on both
employment and earnings are Zarger than comparabZe US findings. Zn the
dynamic models, Long run eLasticíttes oJ employment mtth respect to mtnimum
mage rates exceed short run eZasticittes.
` I am grateful to Arie Kapteyn and Peter Kooreman for valuable comments and
to the Netherlands Central Buresu of Statistics (CBS) for providing the




In this paper, we present several variants of a micro-econometric model
to explain the distribution of employment and earnings. Emphasis is placed
on the role of minimum wage regulations.
There exists an extensive literature of aggregate time series studies
investigating the impact of the legal minimum wage on aggregate employment
and average earnings. See Brown et el. (1982) for an overview of the US
experience and, e.g., Bazen and Martin (1988) for a more recent study with
French data. In these macro-economic studies, the obvious fact that the
impact of minimum wage regulations strongly varies across education and age
categories, is often neglected. Separate estimation for, e.g., youth and
adults or males and females meets thia objection to some extent.
In two articles by Meyer and Wise (1983e,b), data on individual wage
rates are used to take full account of the labour market heterogeneity
across individuals. Meyer and Wise ellow for two effects of minimum wage
regulations. Obviously, labour income of minimum wage earners depends on the
level of the minimum wage. This is called the 'income effect' for minimum
wage earners. The elasticity of minimum wage earners' earnings with respect
to the minimum wage level is by definition equel to one and the importence
of this effect for the average wage level depends on the fraction of workers
earning the minimum. Secondly, a number of workers will be unemployed due to
the fact that the minimum wage exceeds their marginal productivity. Thus,
minimum wage regulations may have a negative impact on employment,
particularly of low productivity workers.
In this paper, the Meyer and Wise model is extended and adjusted ín
several respects. In the first place, we do not consider the legal minimum
wage, but minimum wages in collective labour agreements, which vary acroas
sectors of the economy. Secondly, we account for the fact that minimum wages
may affect wages above the minimum. Studies of e.g. Gremlich (19~6) and
Linneman (1982) suggest that such impacts are substantial. We thus
relax the marginal productivity assumption, i.e. the assumption that wages
are exclusively determined by the workers' marginal productivity. Finally,
we include lagged employment es an explanatory variable. In this way, ahort
run and long run effects of changes in minimum wage policies can be
distinguished.
The paper is set up as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the
Meyer and Wise model, which serves as a starting point for the analysis, and
we introduce and motivate various model adjustments and extensions. The
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model is estimated with Ihitch panel data spanning 1984 - 1987. some features
of which are described in section 3. In section 4 the estimation results are
presented, which are illustrated by some simulations in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2. The miodel
We first describe the static version of the model. Incorporation of
dynamic features will be discussed below. Starting point of the enalysis is
the 'general two-equation model' of Meyer and Wise (1983a, section B),
describing employment and wage relationships in the absence of minimum wage
regulations (the index indicating the individual has been suppressed):
E~- X'a t E1
E'~- Y'p ~ EZ
(1)
(Z)
Equation (1) reflects the poasibility that someone does not work for
reasons other than existing minimum wage regulations. This is the case if
EM(0. If E~)0, then the individual would be employed if minimum wage
regulations would not apply. Essentially, equation (1) is a reduced form
equation with the same interpretation es the participation equation in Meyer
and Wise (1983a,b) and Van Soest (1989). If E~~O then the individual does
not work. If E~~O, he or she may work, depending on minimum wage and
marginal productivity. The vector X in principle includes all relevant
ohserved individuel characteristics, i.e. those which affect supply
(Fn-ofereni~us und t.hu budf{ut set), tts well es thosa whlch affect demnnd. In
ttiis way, we also allow for involuntary unemployment which is not due to
minimum wage regulations.
Note that the reduced form nature of (1) implies that the model does not
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. Contrary to
Meyer and Wise, we do not e priori exclude any individuals between 16 and 65
years of age from the sample. Thua people with negative E~ may be students,
disabled, retired, working without pay, involuntary unemployed due to other
reasons than minimum wage regultationa, etc.
Equation (2) definea the (natural) logarithm of the individual's
productivity. It cen be interpreted as the log of the maximum (before tax)
wage rate a firm is prepared to pay the individual, if productivity can be
-3-
measured without error and complete information about the worker's
productivity is available, and if there are no adjustment costs. F'~ clearly
depends on individual characteristics which affect productivity. In the
household data that we use, the observed characteristics relating to
productivity are mainly age and education variables. Following Meyer and
Wise (1983a), we shall take Y equal to X. Thus Y also includes variablea
referring to preferences, like e.g. family composition. These variables
might be related to e.g. working attitude and thus indirectly affect
productivity.
Meyer and Wise complete their model by comparing F' with log M, where M
is the legal minimum wage rate. If F" exceeds log M, then the minimum wage
rate has no impact, and the individusl will be employed with log wege rate
equal to F~. His wage rate is then exclusively determined by marginal
productivity. As a consequence, the model dces not allow for an effect of
minimum wage rates on above minimum earnings. If F~ is smaller than log M,
Meyer and Wise distinguish three possibilities: The legal minimum dces not
apply (i.e. the relevant minimum is equal to 0), the worker is no longer
hired because marginal costs (M) exceed marginal revenues (exp(F`)), or the
worker is hired and paid the minimum.
The third possibility is not consistent with neoclassical marginal
productivity theory in its simplest form. Meyer and Wise (1983b) present
several explanations for this possibility, implying that the employer is
able to Increase the worker's marginal productivity beyond exp(F~)
('marginal productivity in normal circumstances'), by reallocating tasks or
reducing the level of non-wage compensation. Alternative explanations might
be lack of information about the worker's productivity or the existence of
adjustment costs such as e.g. firing and hiring costs.
In the Meyer and Wise model, the (before tax) wage rate is either equsl
to the marginal productivity or equel to the legal minimum. The explanation
for the latter possibility may not be convincing from an economic point of
view, but is necessary to explain the spike in the wage distribution at the
minimum. In the data for The Netherlands which we use, such a spike at the
legal minimum hardly exists. One possible explenation may be the existence
of ineasurement errors in the observed wage rates. A model in which these
measurement errors are explicítly incorporated is analyzed in Van Soest
(1989).
In this paper we follow an alternative approach. Y'nge rates of moat
employees in The Netherlands are determined by collective labour agreementa,
including minimum wage regulations. This suggests that the minimum wage rate
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which is relevant for some individual is not the legal minimum, but the
minimum agreed upon in his or her branch of industry. It is this relevant
minimum wage rate which we shall incorporate in the model.
In the data, information about the individual's sector of employment is
only available in rather aggregate form. Seven sectors are distinguished:
agriculture, manufacturing, trade, transport, construction, banking and
insurance, and other services. The observed average sector minimum is
denoted by M. If the relevant sector is not known (as is the case for people
who worked at none of the times of the interviews), M is defined as the
weighted average of all sector minima. The relevant minimum is now given by
equation (3):
TM - log M. E 3 (3)
Here T~ denotes the log of the (before tax) relevant minimum. The error term
E3 represents deviations between the individual's relevant minimum and the
sector average minimum. It seems reasonable to assume that the variance of
the distríbution from which e3 is drawn is larger in case the sector is not
known than in case the sector is known.
Given (1)-(3), we may now distinguish various cases:
state I: E'(0.
In this case the individual does not work, irrespective of the values of
F~ and T". He is either voluntary unemployed or involuntary unemployed,
but not due to minimum wage regulations.
state III: E`)0, F~)TM.
In this case, the individual's productivity is large enough to make it
attractive for the firm to hire him. Thus we assume that he will be
employed. Furthermore, we generalize the Meyer and Wise assumption about
the relation between wage and marginal productivity: We assume that the
wage rate W is determined by both the productivity and the relevant
minimum:
1og w-(1-v) F' i w T' (4)
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Here y is a parameter with 0(y(1. If y-0 then the individual is paid
accordíng to productivity. This is the Meyer and Wise case. If y)0, then
the wage rate is below marginal productivity. W can be seen as the
outcome of a Nash bargaining process where F' is the threat point of the
firm and T' is the threat point of the indivíduel (see, e.g., Mortensen,
i986). y is thus positively related to the bargaining power of the firm.
The higher y, the lower W. Throughout the empirical part of the paper we
assume that y is the same for all individuals. It is in principle
straightforward to allow y to depend on exogenous variables, such as the
educatíon level, such that y may vary across different types of jobs.
states II and IV: E')0, F'(T'
In this case the firm should, from the point of view of the standard
neoclassical framework, not hire the individual. Thus, one possible
outcome is that the individual is unemployed. Since E'(0 refers to all
sources of unemployment other than minimum wage regulations, every
individual with E')0 would be employed if T' were very low. Thus,
unemployment of those with E')0 and F"(T' can be interpreted as
unemployment due to minimum wage regulations.
As noted above, several reasons can be suggested why the firm may,
despite the low productivity, still be prepared to employ the individual
and pay the minimum. The probability of this event is denoted by PT. We
thus assume that if E')O and F'(T', two outcomes are possible:
unemployment, with probability 1-PT, i.e. state II, and employment with
wage rate T', with probability PT, i.e. state IV.
Summarizing, four states are distinguished:
I: unemployed for other reasons than minimum wage regulations
II: unemployed due to minimum wage regulations
III: employed and earning more than the minimum wage
IV: employed and earning the minimum wage.
Note that the specification of both the Meyer and Wise model and the
extension introduced above imply that the employment effect of minimum wages
is negative. In principle, there mqy also exist a positive effect of minimum
wage regulations on employment. For this to be the case, three conditions
must be satisfied: the minimum wage rate must positively affect expected
earnings, labour supply must be a forward bending of expected earnings, and
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employment must be sensitive to labour supply changes, i.e. not exclusively
be determined by labour demand. In our model, labour supply is determined by
equatíon (1) and is not affected by minimum wages. Particularly for males,
this assumption dces not seem very harmful, since the empirical literature
suggests that labour market participation and labour supply of males is
hardly sensitive to wage rates ( see, e.g., Pencavel, 1986).
The wage equation for people in state III can be rewritten as follows.
Substituting (2) and (3) into (4) yields log W- W', where W' is defined by
W' '(1-W)Y'~ t W log M t(1-W)EZf W E3 (5)
Moreover, F'~T" is equivalent to W')T'. Thus, throughout the model, F' can
be eliminated and replaced by W'. This makes clear that the only difference
between the wage equation (5) and the wage equation in the Meyer and Wise
model is the fact that the minimum wage is included in the list of
regressors. If log M would be a linear combination of the regressors
included in Y, then W would not be identified, unless restrictions were
imposed on the covariance structure of the error terms. The fact that M
varies across sectors instead of with age only (as would be the case with
the legal minimum) makes it possible to estimate W.
Equation (5) can be rewritten as a reduced form equation for W':
W' - Y'n r W loB M t Ez (6)
Here n-(1-W)p and E2-(1-W)é2.WE3. The Meyer and Wise hypothesis that the
wage rates of people in state III equel their marginal productivity is thus
simply the hypothesis that W-O.
In a competitive labour market equilibrium, the firms' marginal costs of
labour are equal to the workers' marginal productivity, which corresponds to
W-O. Interpreteing the fixed parameter W as the average value across
different types of jobs, W~0 can be explained by the fact that their is
monopsonistic power among firms for some types of labour. The pure monopsony
case would, in case of inelastic labour supply, imply that W would be equal
to 1. W will be smaller than 1 because firms do compete and workers do
cooperate. In The Netherlands, wages are to a large extent determined by
collective agreements between employer organisations and unions. Therefore,
the bargaining proceas might well be a better description of the Dutch
labour market than the competitive model.
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We assume that the vector of error terms (el,e2,e3)' in the model is
drawn from a trivariate normal distribution with mean (0,0,0)' end
covarience matrix E. By way of normalisation, E(1,1) is set equsl to 1.
In the empirical part of the paper, E(1,3) has been set equel to 0. If y)0,
it dces not seem reasonable to assume that E(2,3)-0, considering the fact
that e2 is defined as (i-y)ÉZ.yE3. If we assume that Cov(é2,e3)-0, then we
have E(2.3) - yE(3.3). This yields an extra source of 3dentification of y.
Finally, we shall work with different values of E(3,3), depending on whether
someone's sector of employment is known or unknown. The difference between
JE(3,3) for those with unknown sector and JE(3,3) for those with known
sector will be set equal to 0.05, corresponding to the variation in log M
across sectors.
The static model introduced above can be used to investigate to what
extent unemployment is caused by minimum wage regulations and in which way
minimum wage regulations affect the earnings distribution. Under extra
assumptions (mainly ceteris parfbus conditions), it can be used to predict
the effects of changes in relevant minimum wages for employment and earnings
of various types of workers. It dces however not reveal the lags with which
such effects will come about.
A first step towards a dynamic model is to incorporate lagged endogenous
variables. Obviously, various features of someone's labour market history
may have been of influence on his or her present labour market status. The
only lagged variable which we take into account is a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the individual was employed one year before the
time of the interview. The lagged wage rate is not included. Taking into
account the fact that this wage rate may refer to either lagged productivity
or the lagged relevant minimum would add too much complexity to the model.
Moreover, for many individuals, including all those who were not employed
one year before the time of the interview, no lagged wage rate has been
observed.
Neither did we include lagged exogenous variables, although this would
have been straightforward. Variation across time of the main exogenous
variables, related to education and age, appears too small to include their
lagged values.
The dummy veriable referring to lagged employment is denoted by DEI.AG,
where DELAG-1 and DELAC-O mean that the individual was and was not employed
one year before the time of the interview, respectively. Lagged employment
is assumed to play a role in three different ways. In the first place, DELAG
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is added as a regressor to the E~-equation (equation (1)). A positive impact
of DELAG on E' may for example be interpreted as habit formation: People who
worked in the past have stronger preferences for work than those who did
not. On the other hand, DELAG also picks up time-persistent unobserved
heterogeneity, whích in the static model was included in the error term el.
In the dynamic model, el has mean zero, conditional on the past.
Accordingly, in the dynamic model, the interpretation of both the error term
end the systematic part X'a, is different from its counterpart in the static
model.
Secondly, DELAG is added to the regreasors in equation (6). A positive
impact of DELAG on W~ can be interpreted as an extra wqy (apart from age) in
which the impact of working experience on productivity is reflected. Such a
positive cetería paríbua impact of DELAG on productivity dces not
necessarily imply that working is a better w~y of improving productivity
than not working. Particulerly for young people, education may well be a
better alternative. This will be measured by the positive impact of the
education variables in equation (6).1)
Finally, lagged employment is allowed to affect the probability PT that
low productivity workers are employed and receive the minimum. We have noted
above that PT)0 cannot be explained in a standard neoclassical framework. In
our view, the presence of adjustment costs such as e.g. costs associated
with hiring and firing employees might provide a Feasible explanation. This
implies that an employed worker may not be fired immediately if his
productivity falls below the minimum. On the other hand, it dces not explein
why unemployed low productivity workers would be hired. Thus, we would
expect PT to be larger for those with DELAG-1 than for those with DELAG-O.
If we ignore the possibility that, within one year, an unemployed worker is
first hired since his productivity exceeds the minimum, and that after this
his productivity falls below the minimum, then it seems reasonable to assume
that PT-O for those with DELAG-O. In what follows, PT for those with DELAG-1
and DELAG-O will be denoted by PTE and PTU, respectively.
The explanation given above is similar to a partiel adjustment
mechanism. If W`CT~ and E~)0, the 'optimal' labour market status in a static
framework, ignoring adjustment costs etc., is unemployment. For an employed
worker, 1-PT can be interpreted as the probability that the transition from
employment to unemployment indeed takes place, and PT is the probability
that it does not take place.
On the other hand, we still assume that if E~CO the individual will
certainly not work, even though he was working previously. This is because
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lagged unemployment is already incorporated as a regressor in the EM-
equation itself. Moreover, we expect that adjustment costs will on ave~age
not play an important role here, since Ew(0 mainly refers to non-
participation or voluntary unemployment.
Following the partial adjustment argument, it might also be considered
to introduce the possibility that, if the static model predicts a change
from unemployment to employment, the transition dces not occur. Preliminary
estimation results however suggested that the probability of this is zero.
The likelihood function
Both the static and the dynamic model are estimated by Maximum
Likelihood. We describe the likelihood contribution of each individuel in
the sample for the static case, leaving the dynamic case as a
straightforward extension.
Apart from the model assumptions given above, an extra assumption is
needed to take account of the fact that not all wage rates of workers are
observed. As in Meyer and Wise (1983a), we assume that the event that a
worker's wage rate is not observed is independent of the other rendom
variables in the model. The probability of this event may depend on the
exogenous variables and is denoted by PU.
As in the Meyer and Wise model, it is not observed whether an unemployed
person is unemployed due to minimum wage regulations (E'~0, W~CT") or
because of some other reason (E~(0). Due to the error term in the minimum
wage equation, it is also not observed with certainty whether a worker's
wage rate is above, below, or equal to the (relevant) minimum, even if this
wage rate is observed. This lack of information is en important difference
with the Meyer and Wise models, which suggests that particularly the
parameters PT (or, in the dynamic model, PTU and PTE) and the covariance
matrix of the error terms might be harder to estimate than in the Meyer and
Wise case. Moreuver, the sensitívity of the results with respect to chosen
distributional assumptions might be larger.
'fhree observed categories of sample observations can be distinguished:
non-workers, workers whose wage rates are not observed, and workers with
known wage rate. The likelihood contribution Li of individual i in either
one of these three categories can be written as a sum of two probabilities,
corresponding to different states:
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a. non-workers are either in state I or state II:
Li- Pr[Eli~-Xia] t(1-PT) Pr[-EliCXia end ezi-E31(-Yin .(1-W)log Mi]
This is a linear combination of a univariate and a bivariate normal
cumulative probability.
b. workers with unknown wage rate are either in state III or state IV:
Lt- PU {Pr[-EliCXioe and e3i-e2iCYirt -(1-W)loB Mi] '
Pr[-eliCXioc and e21-E33C-Yirt .(1-W)log Mi] PT}
c. workers with known wage rate Wi are either in state III or state IV.
Let al - log Wi-Yin - y log Mi, e2 - log Wi- log Mi, and let fl and fz be
the (normal) probability density functions of e2i and e3i, respectively.
Then the likelihood contribution is given by:
Lt- {1-PU}{Pr[-eli~Xiac and e3i-e2iCYirt -(1-W)log Mi~ E2i- al]fl(al) .
Pr[-eli(Xioe and E2i-E3iC-Yin i(1-Y)log M1I e3i-a2] PT f2(a2)}
The two conditional probabilities are both bivariate normal and
corresponding means and variances can easily be derived (see, e.g.,
Johnson and Kotz, 1972).
Note that the value of PU will have no impact on the ML-estimates of the
other parameters, irrespective of whether PU is allowed to vary with the
exogenous variables or not. In the remainder of the paper, we do not pay
attention to estimation of PU.
3. The Data
The analysis in this paper is restrícted to males between 16 and 65
years of age. We used data from various waves of the 'Socio Economic Panel',
collected by The Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. We combined data
collected in October 1985, October 1986 and October 1987. For the
construction of DELAG, we also used the October 1984 wave. The panel
nature of the data was used in order to construct the lagged employment
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dummy and to correct wrong or missing information, mainly on the exogenous
variables. Information on the sample composition is presented in table 1.
Table 1. Sample Composition
oct. '85 oct. '86 oct. '87
DELAG-O:
Working, wage rate known: 78 95 120
Working, wage rate unknown: 38 30 22
Not working: 510 618 771
subtotal: 626 743 913
DELAG-1:
Working, wage rate known: 1557 1862 2387
Working, wege rate unknown: 234 259 255
Not working: 84 93 136
subtotal: 1875 2214 2778
All sample individuals:
Working, wage rate known: 1635 1957 2507
Working, wage rate unknown: 272 289 277
Not working: 594 711 907
total: 2501 2957 3691
The table reveals a strong positive correlation between employment
status one year ago and actuel employment status. The number of individuals
with DELAG-O who are currently working and whose wage rates are observed
appears to be rather small.
In the empirical analysis, the following exogenous variables are
included in the vectors X and Y:
CONST: constant term
DED2, DED3, DED4 and DEDS: dummy variables referring to the individual's
education level. At the lowest level, all dummies are 0. At the
thírd level DED3-1 and DED2-DED4-DED5-0, etc.




DRAN: dummy variable; DRAN-1 if the family lives in the western part of
The Netherlands ( 'Randstad'); DRAN-O otherwise.
UNP: unemployment rate in the region where the individual lives (11
regions are distinguished)
NCH: the number of children in the family (NCH-O íf the individual is
not one of the parents).
DCH6: dummy variable; DCH6r1 if the individual has children younger then
six, DCH6-0 otherwise.
DSI: dummy variable; DSI-1 in case of a one-person household; DSI-O
otherwise.
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DHP: dummy variable; DHP-1 if the individusl is the head of a family and
DSI-O; DHP-O otherwise.
D86: dummy variable; D86-1 for an observation in 1986; D86-0 otherwise.
D87: dummy variable; D87-1 for an observation in 1987; D87-0 otherwíse.
Sample statistics of these exogenous variables, the minimum wage rate M,
and the observed wage rates W, are given in table 2. Sample statiatics of W
relate to those with Imown wage rate only. Separate statistics are given for
those who were unemployed and those who were employed a year ago. On
average, the wage rate for those with DELAGaO appears to be substantially
Jower than for thoae with DELAQ~1.
Table 2. Sample Statistics
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD MINIMUM MAXIMUM
DEVIATION VALUE VALUE
log M z.381 0.217 i.45i z.6o1
DED2 0.220 0.414 0.000 1.000
DED3 0.419 0.493 0.00o i.ooo
DED4 0.119 0.323 0.00o i.ooo
DED5 0.053 0.224 0.000 1.000
LAGE 3.581 o.35i 2.833 4.159
L2AGE 1z.948 2.48i 8.027 17.296
LADED3 1.509 1.788 0.000 4.159
LADED45 0.632 1.391 0.000 4.159
DHAN o.403 0.491 0.00o i.000
UNEMP 0.148 0.021 0.097 0.227
NCH 0.876 1.092 0.000 6.000
DCH6 0.219 0.414 0.000 1.000
DHp o.766 0.423 0.00o i.ooo
DSI 0.080 0.271 0.000 1.000
w, All: 24.856 14.963 2.330 539.045
w, DELAG-O: 15.405 11.692 2.330 121.425
w, DELAG-1: 25.332 i4.952 2.640 539.045
Table 3 provides some informatlon about the ratio of the observed wage
rate W to the observed average minimum wage rate M. The table shows that the
number of people earning exactly the average sector minimum is small. In
this respect, our data differ substantislly from the Meyer and Wise data.
Several explanations can be suggested. The first possibility is that PT is
very small. Secondly, the average minimum may be a poor approximation of the
relevant minimum for a given individuel. These two explanations are allowed
for in the model introduced in the previous section. A third possibility, s
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measurement error in the observed wage rate W, has been modelled in Van
Soest (1989).2)
Table 3. Observed Actuel and Minimum Wage Rates
education level age class total
wIM ~ 1 2 3 4 5 ~ i 2 3 4 5 ~ ~
-----------t---------------------------~-------------------------~-------~
~0.90 2.8 i.8 i.4 0.4 0.5 5.6 i.2 0.8 0.9 i.9 i.5
~o.9o,to.95 i.4 0.6 0.4 o.z o.3 z.i o.3 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.5
io.95,~i.oo 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.0 2.3 0.6 o.i 0.3 0.0 0.5
ii.oo,~i.o5 1.7 1.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.8
i1.05,~i.1o i.2 i.8 0.8 0.0 0.2 3.9 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9
ii.i0 92.i 93.5 96.4 99.i 98.9 83.6 96.4 98.0 97.0 96.4 95.8
-----------~---------------------------t------------------------- ;-------t
Explanation.
cell entries are percentages of column totals.
education levels: see definition of DED2, DED3, etc.
age bracket 1: 16-24, 2: 25-34. 3: 35-44, 4: 45-54 5: 55-64.
4. Estimation Results
Several specifications of the model have been estímated by maximum
likelihood, using the algorithm of Berndt et al. (1974). Estimation results
for one static and two dynamic versions are presented in table 4.
The estimate of E(3,3), the variance of the error term in the minimum
wage equation, is surprisingly large. One reason might be the fact that we
did not explicitly allow for the possibility that no minimum is relevant
(i.e. the probability Pi in the Meyer and Wise model is set equal to O). In
our model, the minimum will play no role if E3 is much smaller than 0.
The estimated covariance between the error terms in the EM- and W~-
equations is not significantly different from 0. This corresponds to the
common empirical finding that the participation decision of males is
insensitive with respect to the wage rate.
We have imposed the restriction ï(2,3) - w F(3.3). corresponding to the
assumption that É2 in equation (2) end e3 in equation (3) are independent.
The static model was also estimated without imposing this restriction. The
restriction was not rejected by a likelihood ratio test at the 5x level (the
value of the test statistic being 2.94, with critical value x1;o.o5 - 3.84).
Moreover, the estimates and their standard errors in the restricted and
unrestricted case appeared to be almost identical.
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Table 4. Estimation Results
Static model Dynamic Model; P'fU-O Dynamic Model; PTU-PTE
parameter st. error parameter st. error parameter st. error
JF(2,2) 0.338 O.oo3 0.335 0.003 0.339 0.003
JF(3,3)3) 0.360 0.019 0.367 0.019 0.382 0.019
P(i,2) -0.003 O.i47 0.035 0.130 0.059 0.149
a(2.3) 0.173 ----- 0.194 ----- 0.114 -----
PTU o.398 0.069 0.000 ----- 0.749 o.o3i
PTE o.398 0.069 0.698 0.037 0.749 0.031
E~equation
corisz' -76.311 3.5io -50.129 4.683 -44.780 3.890
DED2 0.271 0.070 0.235 0.102 0.233 0.087
DED3 -2.574 0.452 -1.758 0.664 -1.642 0.579
DED4 -6.506 0.893 -1.878 1.207 -0.906 1.107
DED5 -6.487 0.886 -1.843 1.214 -0.879 1.116
LACE 45.320 2.052 30.727 2.745 27.3i2 2.276
L2AGE -6.545 0.291 -4.618 0.392 -4.111 0.326
LADED3 0.777 0.121 0.537 o.i83 0.516 0.163
LADED45 1.824 0.232 0.549 0.316 0.316 0.292
DRAN o.037 0.056 -o.i98 0.085 -O.i46 0.076
~ -3-393 1.270 -4.077 2.i05 -4.206 1.821
NCH 0.242 0.057 0.077 0.068 0.094 0.062
DCH6 0.092 0.202 -0.353 O.i80 -0.332 o.i61
DHP o.436 o.iz8 -0.233 o.i69 -0.098 o.i4o
Dsl -0.398 0.121 -0.661 o.i63 -0.520 o.i35
D86 -0.067 0.065 0.030 0.096 0.004 0.084
D87 -o.il~ 0.061 -o.i49 0.089 -0.133 O.oBo
DELnc ----- ----- 3.424 o.i19 3-433 o.ii6
W;-equation
CoNST -10.462 1.765 -10.960 1.000 -11.516 1.060
DED2 0.100 0.017 0.070 0.017 0.073 0.018
DED3 -0.205 o.i57 -o.z8z o.i43 -O.z36 o.i5o
DED4 -1.332 0.224 -1.450 o.i87 -1.387 0.193
DEDS -1.171 0.225 -1.292 o.i89 -1.227 o.i96
LAGE 6.844 i.o21 7.044 0.582 7.400 0.611
L2ACE -0.907 0.145 -0.936 o.o8i -0.983 0.085
LADED3 o.i25 0.043 o.i35 0.039 0.124 0.041
LADED45 0.512 0.061 0.533 0.051 0.517 0.052
DRAN o.085 o.0i0 0.081 0.010 0.083 O.oli
UNP -0.599 0.268 -0.446 0.267 -0.436 0.276
NCH -0.016 O.oo5 -0.014 0.005 -0.015 0.005
DCH6 0.017 o.oi3 0.021 0.013 0.022 0.014
Dt~ 0.149 0.026 o.i38 0.026 o.i57 0.028
Dsl 0.061 o.o3z o.072 0.030 0.091 0.032
D86 0.007 0.012 0.003 0.012 0.006 0.013
D87 O.o4z 0.01z o.037 0.012 0.039 0.012
loe M 0.162 0.048 0.178 0.045 0.101 0.046
DELAG ----- ----- 0.152 0.053 0.190 0.068
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In the static model, the estimate of PT (zPTU-PTE) is o.398, with
corresponding standard error o.069. This would imply that a subatantisl
number of low productivity workers are paid above their productivity. 60X of
workers with productivity below the minisum are not employed. What this
implies for the extent to which unemployment cen be attributed to minimum
wage regulations will be discussed below.
In the dynamic model with PTUsO, the fact that low productivity workers
are still employed is explained by the presence of adjuatment costa. People
who previously had no job (DELAO) do not have this opportunity. The
resulting estimate for people with DELAG-1 is almost 0.7 with a surprisingly
small standard error of 0.037- 7'he results of the atatic and the dynamic
model are in agreement with each other, in the sense that PT is some
weighted average of PTE and PTU.
Supplementary estimation results show however that this conclusion may
be premature. Estimation of the dynemic model without imposition of PTU-O
yields PTU-0.97. with stendard error of 0.37. "1'his estimate may be
inaccurate, but it is significantly different from 0. The corresponding
estimate of PTE is 0.75 (with standard error 0.03). The fact that PTU
exceeds PTE contradicts economic intuition. Moreover, the valuea of PTE and
PTU now both strongly exceed the value of PT in the static model.
These results suggest that it is worthwile to estimate the dynamic model
under the restriction PTU-PTE. The resulting estimate for PTU-PTE again
equals approximately 0.75, i.e. is much larger than in the static model. .
Comparison of the estimates of PTU end PTE for slightly different
specifications of the rest of the model shows that these estimates are
particularly sensitive to the specification chosen. The fact that, due to
the presence of the error term e3, we do not observe whether wage rates are
equel to the minimum or not, is probably the main reason for this. In Meyer
and Wise (1983b), PT has been allowed to depend on the gap between the
minimum and the productivity wage rate. From a theoretical point of view,
this is an appealing generalization. Preliminary estimation results with our
data however yield unsatisfactory results in this respect.4)
In the static model, most of the estimates of the slope coefficients in
the E~-equation are significantly different from zero at the 5X level. The
effects of the age end education variables, including the product terma, are
illustrated in figure 1. This figure presents age patterns of the
probability P[E')0] for three education levels, with other characteristics






















Figure 1. P(E~~O); Static Model.
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For males between 30 and 45, the probability is close to 100X. The model
will thus attribute most unemployment among these males to minimum wage
regulations. Due to the positive sign of the coefficients of LADED3 and
LADED45, the graph shifts to the right if the education level increases. In
particular, the number of joblesa malea over 50 with low education level is
relatively large. Disability is probably the main explanation.5)
There appears to be a significantly negative impact of the unemployment
rate in the region on P[E`)0]. This can be explained as a discouraged worker
effect: A larger unemployment rate implies amaller chances of finding work,
and this may reduce the willingneas to search for a job. Being head of the
family increases P[E`)0] significantly, particularly in the presence of
children. Single males are less likely to work than others.
In both dynamic versions of the model, the E`-equation is dominated by
the lagged employment dummy DELAG. People who worked last year ceteris
paribus have a much larger employment probability than those who did not.
As has been explained in section 2, this may be explained with labour supply
arguments such as habit formation or unobserved heterogeneity. Unobaerved
heterogeneity which affects demand and cannot be expressed in terms of
productivity may also pla,y a role. For example, we did not include variables
indicating race or nationality, which might affect both supply and demand.
According to the results for the dynamic model, P[E`)O~DELAG-1] is
almost equal to one except for males of 45 years or over. P[E`)O~DELAG-O] is
small for young males, reaches a maximum of approximately 0.5 between 25 and
35 years of age, and then strongly decreases. For males over 50, the
estimated probability of reentering employment is less then lOx. For males
of low education level, this probability decreases at an earlier age than
for males with a high level of education.
The impact of age and education on the log wage rate W` according to the
static model is illustrated in figure 2. As in figure 1, we have sketched
the age pattern for various education levels, with other variables set equal
to their sample meens. Productivity increases during the largest part of the
life cycle, the growth being strongest for the highest education levels. The
differences between productivity at various education levels also become
apparent. In the dynamic models, the ceteris paribus impact of age and
education variables is almost the same as in the atatic model. Most of the
standard errors of the parameter eatimates are smaller then in the atatic
case.
In the part of The Netherlends called Randstad (the western
conurbation), W` is significantly higher than in the rest of the country.
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Variables relating to family composition and the regional unemployment rate
were not expected to play a large role, if W` is exclusively determined by
productivity and minimum wage regulations. Still, some of the estimates are
significantly different from 0. In case of UNP, the negative sign might
refer to an impact of the unemployment rate on the power of the firm in the
wage bargaining process.6j Family composition variables might serve as
indicators for unobserved productivity heterogeneity, e.g. due to
differences in working attitudes.
The estimates of y, the ccefficient of log M in the W-equation,
indicate that the minimum wage has a significantly positive impact on the
actuel wage rate oF workers with productivity above the minimum. The
hypothesis that these wage rates are exclusively determined by productivity
will thus be rejected. Obviously, since variation across sectors is the main
source of variation in log M, this conclusion hinges upon the assumption
that differences in log M do not reflect ceteris parfbus productivity
differences between sectors.
According to the results for the dynamic modela, lagged employment
significantly affects actual productivity, with the expected positive sign.
T'he role of DELAG in the W`-equation however is much smaller than in the E`-
equation. This is also reflected by the small differences between the static
and dynamic models for the other parameter estimates in the W'-equation.
This section will be concluded by illustrating the meaning of the
results for some representative individuals. In particular, we look at the
estimated probability of unemployment due to minimum wage regulations, i.e.
P[E`)0 and WMCT"'](1-PT) in the static model, and the conditional
probabilities P[E`~0 end W`CT"~DELAG~O](1-PTU) and P[E`)0 and
W`CT"~DELAG-1](1-PTE) in the dynamic model. As in figures 1 and 2, we look
at the age and education pattern, other characteristíca set equal to their
sample means.
Figure 3 refers to the static model. Unemployment due to minimum wage
regulations is substantial for the lowest education level. For young males,
the probability is small, mainly due to the large probability P[E`CO] (see
figure 1). Most unemployment due to minimum wage regulations occurs at an
age where people have just entered the labour market. For older people,
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Age
Figure 5. P(E~~O and W~CT'). Dynamic model (PTU-O); DELAGzO.
- education level 1; ----- educ. level 3; -.--- educ. level 5
Frequency
(tn 7.)
F~re 6. Wage rate distribution. Static Model.
snmple díst.ribution; - ---- aímulated díatribution
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Figures 4 and 5 refer to the dynamic model with PTU-O, for someone with
DELAG-1 and DELAG-O, respectively. Unlike in the static model, if DELAG-1,
the probability of unemployment due to minimum wage regulations decreases as
a function af age. The reason for the difference is that P[E')O~DELAG-1] ia
large for young people also. The age and education pattern in figure 5
resembles that of the static model. On average, the probability of
unemployment due to minimum wage regulations according to the dynamic model
agrees reasonably well with the static model results.
We do not present graphs for the dynemic model with PTUzPTE. In this
case, the pattern of P[E')0 and W(T'~DELAGLI] is almost the same as in the
other dynamic model, with slightly smaller valuea for young males. The
values of P[E')0 and W'~T'~DELAG-O] are much smaller, with a maximum of
about 5X at age 22 for people with low educution level. The differences
between the two dynamic models correspond to the different values of PTE and
PTU.
5. Simulations
The working of the model snd the implications of the estimation results
cen be illustrated with simulations. The first simulation is based on the
actual minimum wage regulations. It shows to what extent unemployment is
explained by minimum wage regulations. Moreover, comparison of simulated
means with sample means sheds some light on the quality of the model.
For each individual, ten rendom draws were taken from the estimated
distributíon of the vector of error terms. Next, for each draw, the model
predictions of W', T' end E' were computed. The results were used to obtain
average state I and state II probabilities end average wage rates for
various age and education categories. Results for the static end the two
dynamic versions of the model are presented in table 5.
According to the model, people without a job are either in state I or in
state II. In table 5, the simulated probabilities of both states are given
(as a fraction of all people in a given age or education category). In case
of a perfect fit, these probabilities would add up to the semple fraction of
unemployment. For the age and education categories, probabilities and sample
fractions agree reasonably well. The static model obviously cannot explain
the distinction between unemployment probabilities for those wíth DELAG-O
and those with DELAG-1. As to be expected, the dynamic models perform much
better in thia respect.
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Table 5. Simulations based on actual minimum wage regulations
Unemployment probabilities:
Sample Static Model Dynamic Model Dynamic Model
not (PTU~O) (PTU-PTE)
No. working P[I] P[II] P[I] P[II] P[I] P[II]
Age:
16-z4 1432 54.05 44.97 9.29 40.89 10.87 46.45 4.39
25-34 2539 11.03 3-79 7.48 6.77 4.53 7.82 3.27
35-44 2422 7.51 1.81 4.23 5.35 2.21 5.89 1.82
45-54 1459 17.61 13.78 3.99 16.71 1.93 17.16 1.64
55-64 1299 55.35 54.z4 2.10 53.98 0.99 53.89 0.95
Education:
1 1728 45.25 34.44 8.66 39.27 6.07 41.69 3.24
2 2013 28.37 20.54 8.08 21.39 6.24 23-83 3.66
3 3838 18.11 13.90 4.83 15.00 3.26 15.82 2.32
4 1086 10.50 9.08 0.99 9.41 0.69 9.50 0.56
5 486 10.29 10.04 0.55 9.26 0.38 9.59 0.31
DELAG:
0 228z 83.22 42.38 6.38 75.26 7.48 80.56 1.63
1 6869 4.56 10.52 5.32 1.67 2.83 1.72 2.76
All: 9151 24.17 18.46 5.58 20.02 3.99 21.38 2.47
Mean wage rates-
Sample Static Model Dynemic Model Dynamic Model
Age:
16-z4 12.38 12.27 11.67 11.71
25-34 21.29 21.33 21.35 z1.28
35-44 25.01 24.96 25.22 25.23
45-54 z5.79 25.50 25.80 25.82
55-64 26.47 26.05 25.61 25.60
Education:
1 17.57 17-38 17.49 17.42
2 18.26 18.15 17.87 17.87
3 22.37 22.49 22.36 22.33
4 30.47 30.70 30.56 30.50
5 37.05 36.62 36.79 36.85
DELAG:
0 12.90 17.74 13.09 12.97
1 23.03 z3.41 22.96 22.96
All: 22.40 22.34 22.24 22.21
Explanation-
No.: sample number.
Not working: number oF non-workers in sample (non-participants included), in
x of No.
P[I]: Simulated probability of state I(E`~0) (ín z of No.).
P[II]: Simulated probability of state II (E`)o, W`CT`) (in X of No.).
In a similar way, semple (geometric) average wage rates can be compared
with simulated wage rates. The resemblence is quite satisfactory. Again, the
dynamic models explain the gap between the average wage rates for those who
did and those who did not work the year before. In other respects, the three
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models perform equally well. These results can be interpreted as a first,
though very incomplete, check on the specification of the model.
According to all models and corresponding to what we concluded from
figures 4 and 5, unemployment due to minimum wage regulations is substantisl
for males of low education levels and of less importence for the high
education categories. Moreover, we again find rather large differences
between the various models. In particular, the dynamic model with PTUsPTE
yields relatively low state II probabilities and attributes more
unemployment to other causes than minimum wage regulationa. As we have
stated before, this corresponds to the high values of PTU and PTE in this
case. The IrCU-F'TE dynamic model ia not able to reproduce the unemployment
fraction in the category DELAG-O to the same extent as the other dynamic
model.
From the second panel of the table, we have concluded that the three
models perform well in the sense that they are able to reproduce sample
means of wage rates to a large extent. A more thorough specificatíon check
can be obtained if, for given categories, the sample distribution of wage
rates is compared with the simulated distribution. We first present some
illustrative graphs.
In figure 6, the wage distribution in the semple has been sketched,
together with the simulated distribution for the static model. Log wage
rates are grouped into intervals of width 0.10. The figure relates to people
of all age and education categories, irrespective of lagged employment
status. Apparently, the wage distribution is tracked to a large extent, but
not completely. The peak in the sample distribution at about Dfl 20 to Dfl
26 per hour is not completely reproduced.
Figures ~ and 8 relate to the dynsmic model with PTU-O, for those with
DELAG-1 and with DELAG-O, respectively. Figvre 7 leads to the same
conclusions as figure 6. The way in which the wage distribution of people
with DELAG-O is reproduced seems quite satisfactory, considering the
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Figure ~. Wage rate distribution. Dynamic Model (PTU-O); DELAG-1.









Figure 8. Wage rate distribution. Dynemic Model (PTU-O); DELAG-G.
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Formal specification tests based on this type of comparisons are chi-
square diagnostics as discussed by Heckman (1984) and Andrews (1988). These
tests are based on partitioning the sample space into a given number of
cells and comparing, for all obaervations, sample probabilities with
predicted probabilities. In case of ML-estimation, the test statistic is
given by the explained sum of squares in a regression of the vector
(1,...,1)'ERn (where n is the number of observations) on the acores end the
differences between observed and predicted cell probabilities.~) We
constructed cells as products of a partition of the space of exogenous
variables (X) into Gx cells and the space of endogenous variablea (Y) into
Gy cells, implying that, under the null of no misspecification, the test
statistic is chi-square distributed with Gx(Gy-1) degrees of freedom.
For Y, we used a partition with Gy-6 cells: non-workers, end workers
divided according to their wage rates: wage rate less than Dfl 15.86,
between Dfl 15.86 and Dfl 19.62, between Dfl 19.62 and Dfl 25.81, more than
Dfl 25.81, and wage rate unknown.8) For X we used the partition with one
cell only and partitions into age or education categories. The test results
indicate that the static model as well as the dynamic models are
misspecified.
Some idea of possible directions of misspecification can be obtained
with Lagrange multiplier tests. In particular, a number of model assumptions
are rejected, such as homoskedasticíty of the error term e2, the assumption
that PT does not depend on exogenous variablea, the lognormal nature of the
wage rate distribution (using Box Cox tranaformations as an alternative),
and the fact that the difference between the relevant minimum and the
observed sector minimum has mean zero and does not vary with age.
The problem with these tests is however that, as soon as one source of
misspecification is present, tests in other directions of misspecification
are no longer valid. The fact that in several cases the null hypothesis is
rejected therefore does not indicate in which direction extension is needed,
although the magnitudes of the test statistics suggest that
heteroskedasticity might be the most important one.
Elasticities
In order to obtain some insight in the sensitivity of employment and
average wage with respect to changes in minímum wage regulations, we
repeated the simulation exercise described above after reducing all minimum
wage rates by lOX. In table 6 we present deviations between simulated
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figures based on actual and reduced minimum wage rates. Note that all
figures should be interpreted in a ceterís paribus framework: It is assumed
that the productivity and participation relations do not shift. This limits
the macro-economic implications of these simulation results.
The sensitivity of employment with respect to minimum wage regulations
strongly depends on the extent to which unemployment is explained by minimum
wage regulations. This explains why the elasticity decreases with education
and age. According to the static model, the elasticity of youth employment
is -0.42. On average, if someone's relevant minimum would fall by lOz, the
probability that he is employed would rise by 1.93X.
In the dynamic model, short run end long run effects are distinguished.
The only dynamics teken into account are those related to the lagged
unemployment variable. Time trends (reflected by D86 and D87) and changing
age or education composition of the sample are ignored.
As in the static model, reducing minimum weges directly increases
employment probabilities, since more workers will have a productivity
exceeding the minimum wage. The larger employment probability leads to an
extra employment increase next year for several reasons. Unemployment not
due to minimum wage regulations decreases, because of the strong positive
impact of lagged employment on the probability P[E~)0]. Moreover, labour
market experience on average increases and this leads to an increase in
productivity. This effect is reflected by the positive impact of DELAG on
W~`. In the model with PTU-O, the difference between PTE and PTU is a third
reason, since in this case, only previously employed workers may work with
productivity below the minimum.
In the dynamic model with PTU-O, the short run employment effect is
smaller than in the static model. In the long run however, the effect is
larger. After three years, it is about twice as large as the short run
effect. In the dynamic model with PTU-PTE, employment effects are much
smaller than in the other dynamic model. Still, the long run elasticity of
employment with respect to minimum wage regulations exceeds the elasticity
in the static model.
-27-
Table 6. Simulation of a reduction of all minimum wage rates by lOx















year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5
empl. wage empl. wage empl. wage empl. wage empl. wage
Age:
16-24 4.35 -4.07 5.95 -3.79 6.77 -3.67 7.28 -3.62 7.63 -3.60
z5-34 1.35 -2.90 2.08 -z.89 2.5z -2.89 2.80 -2.90 2.99 -2.90
35-44 0.72 -2.46 1.18 -2.50 1.49 -2.53 1.72 -z.55 1.89 -2.57
45-54 0.61 -2.45 1.1z -2.51 1.55 -2.57 1.91 -2.62 2.23 -2.67
55-64 0.70 -z.54 1.32 -2.64 1.86 -z.73 2.34 -2.81 2.78 -2.90
Education:
1 2.15 -3.54 3.52 -3.61 4.48 -3.64 5.22 -3.66 5.79 -3.66
2 2.ii -3.46 3.24 -3.44 3.93 -3.44 4.41 -3.43 4.76 -3.43
3 i.o7 -2.74 1.72 -z.78 2.i4 -2.80 2.43 -z.81 2.65 -2.82
4 0.25 -2.09 0.40 -2.11 0.50 -2.12 0.58 -2.iz o.64 -2.~3
5 0.12 -1.94 0.18 -i.94 o.2i -i.95 0.24 -1.95 0.26 -1.96
All: i.zó -3.01 2.00 -3.13 2.49 -3.20 2.84 -3.z6 3.10 -3.30
Dynamic Model (P7'[J-PTE)
year i year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5
empl. wage empl. wage empl. wage empl. wage empl. wage
Age:
16-z4 1.74 -3.72 z.59 -3.48 3.14 -3.38 3.53 -3.33 3.8z -3.31
25-34 0.96 -2.27 i.5o -2.z5 1.83 -2.24 2.04 -2.z4 2.18 -2.24
35-44 0.64 -i.8o 1.04 -1.82 1.30 -1.83 1.49 -1.85 1.63 -1.86
45-54 0.64 -i.83 1.18 -1.89 1.63 -1.95 2.02 -1.99 2.35 -2.04
55-64 0.62 -1.85 1.17 -1.92 1.66 -1.98 2.11 -2.04 2.53 -2.11
Education:
1 i.44 -2.92 2.4i -2.88 3.10 -2.85 3.63 -2.82 4.05 -2.80
2 1.22 -2.68 1.95 -2.63 2.45 -z.ói 2.8i -2.60 3.08 -2.60
3 0.80 -2.03 1.31 -2.03 1.66 -2.04 1.92 -z.o4 2.11 -2.05
4 0.24 -1.36 0.40 -1.38 0.51 -1.39 0.59 -1.40 0.65 -1.41
5 0.12 -1.20 0.17 -1.20 0.21 -1.21 0.24 -1.21 0.26 -1.21
All: 0.85 -2.23 1.40 -z.28 1.78 -z.3z 2.06 -2.35 2.z7 -2.38
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The sensitivity of the average wage rate with respect to minimum wages
has three sources. First of all, wages of minimum wage earners fully
respond. The impact of this on the average wage rate depends on the number
of people with low productivity and the value of PT (or PTU and PTE). Aa a
consequence, this effect is largest for those age and education categories
which, on average, contain most workers with low productivity. Secondly,
wages of all workers with productivity above the minimum respond with
elasticity y, i.e. 0.16 in the static model and 0.18 and 0.10 in the two
dynamic models. As a consequence, the average wage in high productivity
categories is also affected.9) In the third place, the average wage rate
is negatively affected because of the employment change. The number of low
productivity workers increases, and thus the average wage rate decreases. In
the dynamic models, there is also an effect in the opposite direction, since
the employment growth leads to a higher average productivity next year.
According to the static model, the elasticity of the average wage rate
with respect to the minimum is -0.29. In the dynamic models, differences
between long run and short run elasticitíes only stem from the indirect
effect through employment and thus appear to be rather small. In the dynemic
model with PTU-O, the elasticities are -0.30 and -0.33 in the short and long
run, respectively. In the other dynamic model, elasticities are smaller,
mainly because of the smaller estimate of y.
6. Conclusíons
In this paper, we have looked at the impact of minimum wage regulations
from a micro-econometric point of view. Our models extend those in Meyer end
Wise (1983s). Using sector variation across minimum wage rates, we are able
to identify the extent to which minimum wage regulations affect wages of
workers with productivity exceeding the minimum. Thus it is possible to
relax the assumption that these wage rates are exclusively determined by the
worker's productivity. The wage rate is modelled as the outcome of e wage
bargaining process, in which marginal productivity and minimum wage are the
threat points of employer and employee, respectively. Estimation results
suggest that thia is a significant improvement.
In our model, the minimum wage is treated as an unobservable variable,
which consists of an observed sector average and a mean zero error term. As
a consequence, we do not observe whether workera earn exactly the minimum or
not, even if the actual wage rate is observed without error. This makes it
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more difficult to estimate some parameters of the model, including those
determining the distinction between unemployment due to minimum wage
regulations and other reasons for not working.
Thís problem is somewhat similar to problems in neoclassical labour
supply models, in which the shape of the hours distribution muat be used to
distinguish between e.g. measurement errors and random preferences or to
identify unobserved fixed costa or houra conatraints. See, e.g., Moffitt
(1986). As a result, parameter estimates may be sensitive to the
specification of the rest of the model.
In our case, this seems to apply particularly to the pRrsmeters PT' and
PTE and E'CU: The estimates of these parametera vary substantially with the
exact choice of model specification. As a consequence, the estimated
importance of minimum wage regulations as a source of unemployment varies.
Still, for all specifications we find significant evidence for a substantial
negative impact of minimum wage rates on employment end a positive link
between the minimum and average wage levels. This conclusion dces not only
hold for the results presented in this paper, but also for those based upon
similar models estimated with data for the seme Dutch panel. See Van Soest
(1989), Ven Scest and Kapteyn (1989) end Van Scest and Kapteyn (1990).
With the static model, we find ceteria paribus elastícities of
employment with respect to minimum wages of -0.42 for youth and -0.19 for
all males. The youth elasticity is rather large compared to the results
obtained by Meyer and Wise. This might be explained by the fact that in The
Netherlands the level of minimum wage rates is relatively higher than in the
US. Youth as well as adults elasticities are large if compared to US time
series results (see Brown et al., 1982). On the other hand, our result for
youth is well in line with those based on French macro-economic time series
data obtained by Bazen and Martin (1988). They find long run wage
elasticities of -0.42 for youth and -0.05 for adulta. The estimated
elasticities of the average wage rate with respect to the minimum in our
static model are o.35 for youth and 0.29 for sll males, which is also well
in line with the results of Bazen and Martin (1988).
The dynamic structure of the dynamic models we have estimated is
limited. The only lagged variable included is a dummy indicating the
employment status one year before. This variable is allowed to play a role
in several ways. We find that short run effects are smaller than long run
effects snd thus do not find proof of 'overshooting', as in Bazen and
Martin's time series study. The total employment effect of a minimum wage
change after three years is about twice as large as the effect in the first
-3G-
year. The long run effect on the average wage rate only exceeds the short
run effect by a small amount. The effects found with the dynamic model seem
reasonably well in line with those in the static model.
Several checks on the specification of the model are preformed. The
model predictions of average employment probabilities and average wage rates
for various age and education categories resemble the corresponding sample
means quite well. However, comparison of the predicted wage distribution
with the sample distribution, as well as various formal tests, suggest that
at least some misspecification is present. Several further generalizations
of the model can and have been suggested, but it is not clear whether the
data at hand permit fruitful estimation of these modela. More explicit
information would certainly be worthwile, e.g. on sectors or relevent
minimum wage rates, on whether or not someone's wage is determined by some
sector minimum, on why someone is not employed, etc.
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Notes
1) See e.g. Welch (1976) and Leighton and Mincer (1981) for theoretical
studies on the positive effect of minimum wage regulations on the level
of education, and thus on productivity growth. Our model does not
incorporate this effect: the education level is an exogenous variable.
2) Van Opstal (1990) describes data on wage rates collected from firms. He
finds some peak in the wage distribution for young workers (males and
females) in 1985 but not for male adult workers. He also finds that the
number of minimum wage earners has decreased substantially between 1979
and 1985.
We also estimated the static model with both E3 and a measurement error
in observed wage rates. The estimated standard error of the measurement
error however turned out to be zero.
3) The estimate mentioned refers to people whose sector is known. See
section 2.
4) The concerning coefficient has the wrong sígn and is insignificantly
different from 0. In order to avoid computation of trivariate
cumulative normal probabilities, E(1,2) is set equsl to 0.
5) The number of people entitled to disability benefits in The Netherlands
is relatively large if compared to other industrialized countries. In
our data set, more than 30X of all males over 45 with a low education
level receive disability benefits. See Aarts and de Jong (1990) for a
detailed study of this issue.
6) This could be incorporated explicitly by allowing y to depend on UNP.
7) The observed probability is one if the observation belongs to the cell
and zero otherwise. The predicted probability is the probability that
the individual belongs to the cell, given the exogenous variables and
the parameter values.
8) These cell boundaries are the 0.25-, 0.50- and 0.~5-quantiles of the
distribution of sample wage rates.
9) In Van Soest and Kapteyn (1989), a model is discussed in which the
assumption that wages of all workers with productivity above the
minimum are affected is generalised. In that paper, above productivity
workers are divided in two groups. In one group, the minimum does
affect the wage, whereas in the other group, consisting mainly of
high wage earners, it does not.
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